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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF LILLY ON THE
DISALLOWANCE OF EXPENSE AND LOSS
DEDUCTIONS DEEMED CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
Neither the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 nor 1954 has expressly prohibited the deduction of any business expense of any amount
suffered as a loss on the ground that to allow such deduction would
be against public policy. The doctrine under which such deductions
have been disallowed has been judicially developed.
Prior to 1951, the public policy test was being used in certain fact
situations, but its application was becoming vague, hazy, and somewhat
limitless." A United States Supreme Court decision in 1943 had ruled
that certain business expenses would be disallowed " . . . in order

that tax deduction consequences might not frustrate sharply defined
' 2
national or state policies prescribing particular types of conduct.
But even this criterion was too broad, for in Lilly v. C. I. R. the Supreme Court apparently intended to narrow the scope of the doctrine
by declaring that "The policies frustrated must be national or state
policies evidenced by some government declaration of them." 3 [Emphasis supplied]
There remained, however, some, questions unanswered. The precise
application and scope of the rule was not completely and clearly determined. Evidence of this are subsequent decisions which have ignored
Lilly or at least considered it not mnadatory in the particular fact
situations before the court, the proposing by other courts of a different test for allowing or disallowing deductions involving public policy,
and the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court in three rather
recent cases involving public policy considerations.
One probable cause of the confusion still existing is the manner of
expression employed by the Supreme Court in proposing the rule in
Lilly:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that, under some circumstances, business expenditures which are ordinary and necessary
in the generally accepted meanings of those words may not be
deductible as 'ordinary and necessary' expenses under Sec. 23
(a) (1) (A) when they 'frustrate sharply defined national or
State policies prescribing particular types of conduct,' neverthe-4
less the expenditures now before us do not fall into that class."
The rule is negatively stated and permits the argument to be forwarded, on the basis of the words "may not be deductible," that Lilly
See Comment, 51 COL. L. REv. 752 (1951), for a pre- Lilly analysis of the
public policy test.
2 C.I.R. v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
Z Lilly v. C.I.R., 343 U.S. 90 (1951).
4 Id. at 94.
1

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 41

does not direct that business expenses be disallowed because contrary
to sharply defined, governmentally declared public policy. Also, from
the following dicta:
"We do not have before us the issue that would be presented
by expenditures which themselves violated a federal or state law
or were incidental to such violations. In such a case it could be
argued that the outlawed expenditures, by virtue of their illegality were not 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses within
the meaning of Sec. 23 (a) (1) (A)." 5
Together with the language in the previous quotation, it appears
that the question is left open whether, in the light of a finding
that expenses which violated federal or state laws or were incidental
to such violations were ordinary and necessary, such expenses, nevertheless must be disallowed if contrary to public policy. Another inherent vagueness in the Lilly rule is the term "governmental declaration" of national or state policies. This may be taken to mean statutes,
but conceivably the phrase could include judicially declared public
policy as well. And, assuming a governmental declaration of public
policy is found, when is it sharply defined? And when frustrated?
What influence Lilly has had on subsequent litigation in various
areas involving public poilcy will be examined in the following discussion.
I.

PUBLIC

POLICY

As

EXPRESSED BY STATUTES

Governmentally declared public policy is most frequently expressed
in statutes, state and federal. Where the statute provides different
penalties for wilful and non-wilful violations, courts have accordingly
treated deductions of these penalties as business expenses differently,
allowing the deduction of penalties incurred due to non-wilful violations 6 and disallowing the deduction of wilful violation penalties. 7 The
reason advanced by the courts for according different treatment to
non-wilful violations is that, although there is sharply defined public
policy expressed, the deduction of penalties incurred due to non-wilful
violations does not frustrate public policy. Where the statute itself
makes no distinction between wilful and non-wilful violations, the deduction of penalties for all violations, wilful or not, has been held to
frustrate public policy and consequently are disallowed, i.e., where
profits are returned to a corporation pursuant to Sec. (b) of the Securities Exchange Act reating to insiders' profits.8
Fines incurred due to violations of statutes are held to be not de5Id. at 95.
6 Phillip E. Ludwig and Frances D. Kiernan, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. par.

147 (OPA violations).
7George Schaffer and Sons v. C.I.R., 209 F. 2d 440 (2nd Cir. 1953); Union
Packing Co., P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. 308.
8 Robert Lehman, 25 T.C. No. 75 (1955); William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549
(1951); William L. Dempsey, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. 281.
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ductible where the fines were incurred due to overweight trucks9 and
gambling offenses.' The fines incurred in the trucking cases were
imposed by a statute found to be penal. Perhaps a finding that the
statute imposed the fines as a remedial measure, i.e., to recover for
damage done to the roads, and therefore, in effect, a toll paid for the
use of the highways, would result in a contrary decision. Where statutes make the expenditures themselvese a violation of law, such expenses have usually been disallowed as deductions. Some examples
of the above mentioned situation are: protection payments made to
city officials to effect freedom from prosecution for operating slot
machines in violation of law;"' payments made to a director of state
hospitals to influence his buying of supplies in favor of the payer;1.
and expenses incurred in purchasing liquor in violation of a state
statute. 3 Expenses which themselves are not illegal but incurred in
the operation of a business or activity declared unlawful by state law
have also been disallowed where the payments involved expenditures
for medical supplies of an abortionist and kickbacks by such abortionist to persons who referred patients to him, 1 4 and expenditures for the

purchase of liquor to be given away as gifts to promote its sale where
such gifts were forbidden by state law.15
In addition to the aforementioned state and federal statutes evidencing a declaration of public policy, a court has found such declaration also in a city ordinance 6 complementing a state gambling statute.
Somewhat related to the above decision finding public policy expressed
in statutes are those decisions denying the deduction of lobbying expenses as a business expense 7 whether paid to an organization engaged
in lobbying' 8 or spent by the taxpayer himself in carrying on lobbying
activities, 19 unless they are the ordinary and necessary expenses of a
professional lobbyist.2 0 The denial of lobbying expenses as a deduction

is based upon a federal tax reguglation 21 disallowing a charitable con9Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., 242 F.2d 14 (1957), cert. granted,-U.S.-;
Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc.,, 241 F.2d 459 (1957), cert. granted,U.S.-.

Io Automatic Cigarette Sales Corp. v. C.I.R., 234 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956).
11 Samuel Guralnick, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. par. 26; Charles A. Clark, 19
T.C. 48 (1952).
12William T. Stover Co., 27 T.C. No. 48 (1956).
'3 Hiram E. Bowles, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. par. 160; G. E. Fuller, 20 T.C.
4 309 (1953).
1 Estate of Joseph Karger, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. par. 204.
'5 Fred D. Newman, P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. par. 267.
16 See note 10 supra.
1' American Hardware and Equipment Co. v. C.I.R., 202 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.
19

1952).
Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. No. 4 (1956) ; McClintock-Trunkey v. C.I.R., 19 T.C.
297 (1952).
William T. Stover Co., see note 12 supra; Revere Racing Assn. v. Scanlon,

20

137 F. Supp. 293 (D. C. D. Mass. 1955).
Black v. U.S., 129 F. Supp. 956 (Ct. Cl. 1955).

's

"1U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23 (q)-1 (1954).
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tribution deduction of such expenses. The courts have found this regulation to be expressive of congressional intent to disallow any deduction, as a business expense or otherwise, of lobbying expenses.
II. JUDICIALLY DECLARED PUBLIC POLICY
Governmentally declared public policy apparently includes judicially declared public policy as well as legislatively declared policy. Payments made to an extortioner have been disallowed as a business ex22
pense deduction because to do so would be contrary to public policy.
In a closely analogous situation, however, a taxpayer was allowed a
loss deduction for money lost through a Spanish Prisoner swindle.23
The extortion payment situations can be said to have been decided
on judicially declared public policy since the taxpayers themselves violated no statute by making the payments. There was no statute prescribing their conduct. If govermenally declared public policy included
judicially declared policy, then, perhaps, this criterion for disallowing
deductions could become boundless in its application, a result which
Lilly apparently attempted to prevent.
III. LILLY HAS BEEN IGNORED IN SOME
CASES

INVOLVING

PUBLIC

POLICY

Lilly has been ignored in some cases involving public policy considerations. The OPA violation decisions are based on Jerry Rossman
v. C.LR. 24 decided before Lilly which in turn is founded upon C.LR.
v. Heininger25 which is cited with approval in Lilly. Since the OPA
cases are decided upon the theory that the deduction of penalties incurred due to non-wilful violations does not frustrate public policy.
and since Lilly approved the rule in Heininger in regard to frustration
and added only that public policy must be evidenced by some governmental declaration of it, the OPA decisions are consistent with Lilly.
The Seventh Circuit has ignored Lilly but for another reason. In
dealing with expenses involving public policy considerations, that court
has proposed a test somewhat different from that propounded in Lilly.
IV. A NEW TEST IS PROPOSED

The Seventh Circuit's test was proposed in deciding that expenses
which themselves were illegal, and other expenses of a business which
was illegal were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 21 According to the Doyle decision, the test is whether the expenses, economically, are an integral part of the business. If they are,
then they are deductible whether they be lawful or unlawful. The reasoning supporting this test is expressed as follows:
22Samuel Towers, 25 T.C. 199 (1955); Terminal Equipment Corp., P-H 1955
T.C. Mem. Dec. par. 132.
23 Curtis H. Muncie, 18 T.C. 849 (1952).
_4 175 F.2d 711 (2nd Cir. 1949).
25 See note 2 supra.
26 C.I.R. v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (1956); James Ross v. C.I.R., 241 F.2d 47 (7th
Cir. 1957), cert. granted,--U.S.
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"To the extent that such ordinary and necessary business expenses exist, a holding that they are undeductible by a handbook
operator in a state in which the business is unlawful, would
mean that such a tax would be levied by the Federal Government on gross income while a holding that they are deductible
in a state in.which the business is lawful, would mean that
such a tax would be levied on only net income. We cannot
be27
lieve that the Congress intended this inequitable result.
Dicta in the opinion cited examples of expenses which were considered not an integral part of the business, such as bribes paid to
public officers, fines and penalties for violations of state and federal
statutes and certain types of lobbying expenses.
If Lilly bars deductions otherwise ordinary and necessary when
their allowance would frustrate public policy, Lilly would aid the
enforcement of state and federal statutes by preventing the gaining
of any tax advantage by reason of the deduction of expenses of an illegal business, whereas Doyle would put all taxpayers on even footing
as far as their federal income tax is concerned regardless of the business or type of expense as long as the expenses meet the integrality
test.
From a close reading of the language in the Lilly opinion, we find
that the rule had been negatively stated, and if we wished to be critical,
we might conclude that the rule is dicta, and actually only permitting,
not directing, disallowance of deductions when to allow them would
frustrate public policy. But the Court of Appeals in deciding Doyle
apparently did not consider Lilly to be only permissive because to do so
would create the same kind of inequality that the court attempted to
avoid, i.e. depending on a particular court's application of the public
policy test, an illegal bookie could or couldn't take deductions for his
expenses, the same problem that the court saw in the tax treatment of
bookies which operated legally in one state and illegally in another.
If the language in the Lilly decision, that ordinary and necessary
business expenses may not be deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses when they frustrate sharply defined public policy, and the
further language that it could be argued that expenses illegal in themselves or incidental to violations of state or federal laws are not ordinary and necessary by virtue of their illegality, permits the conclusion
that the question is left open whether expenses illegal in themselves
or incidental to illegal activity which are found to be ordinary and necessary expenses must be disallowed because against public policy,
then the integrality test proposed by the Seventh Circuit may not be inconsistent witht the rule in Lilly. The overweight truck fine cases and
the abortionist case might also be decided differently and remain consistent with Lilly if the expenses were found to be ordinary and ne?7 231

F.2d at 638.
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cessary. The granting of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court in the bookmaking and truck fines cases may result in a decision
clearly stating whether such question is left open.
V. CONCLUSION

The adoption of the Seventh Circuit's integrality test by the Supreme Court would presumably change the law in some of the areas
heretofore discussed. The expenses incurred by an abortionist in purchasing medical supplies considered by the court as the tools of his
business, and kickbacks paid by him found to have been paid in direct
consequence of his activity could certainly be found to be expenses
which are an integral part of the business. Although the Doyle and
Ross decisions expressly exclude fines and penalties from the integrality test, the distinction between expenses which are illegal in themselves,
i.e., the payment of wage by a book maker to his employees, and fines
which may be incurred because of the same expenses, in view of their
practically inseparable connection and integrality in the economic structure of the business, appears somewhat arbitrary. If the fines are incurred in direct consequence of an illegal activity for which deductible
expenses are made, then the fines should also be allowed as deductions.
If fines are included, then, in the integrality test, the gambling and
truck fine cases would also be decided differently. Fines must necessarily be incurred by a gambling organization operating illegally, and
therefore this expense may be found to be an integral part of the business. The fines involved in the trucking cases were necessarily incurred in order that taxpayer remain in business. Tank truck rentals,
for example, due to wartime restrictions, could procure only certain
types of trucks, which because of Pennsylvania statutes must now operate illegally or uneconomically to the extent that competition with
other carriers would be impossble.
It is quite probable that the integrality rule of the bookmaking cases
will not be adopted by the Supreme Court for the reason that, from
the language of the Doyle and Ross opinions, the public policy criterion,
as far as governmentally declared public policy on a State level is concerned, is non-existent. This, at least, is a departure from the basic
reasoning of the Lilly decision.
ROBERT C. HART

